The most complicated form of clash an army can experience is counterinsurgency. We find that the US Army has engaged in both policies of attraction chastisement in past counterinsurgency operations and recent operations Iraq and Afghanistan. Policies of attraction have honorable intentions, develop chances of acquiring intelligence, and generate future hope.
The occupying strength may emerge weak, and there are inadequate resources for community having excessive necessities, this may raise insurgents to aim at locals that collaborate hence making it hard to gain the trust of locals. Chastisement policies will create the conflict shorter although it usually evokes rebels to believe reporting to fighting and alienates the residence front populace. In case ,therefore, neither the guidelines of attraction nor the chastisement policies will work in seclusion.
The leaders should comprehend counterinsurgency operations so as to apply the strategy in today’s battlefield. The philosophies used in preceding battles are still applicable on current battle field. It is clear that by understanding the counterinsurgency principles, today’s leaders are able come up with decisions based on prior lessons learned and capable of predicting events taken by the people they seek to direct. Cultivating a system of informers as well as gauging the community mood needs foot military like cops on the beat to involve in continued personal communication with local residents.
Policies of counterinsurgency should be approached in the techniques employed by Soldiers. It is hard to take an old soldier say aged 20 years whose fundamental survival tactics comprise looking for and destroying the opponent, proficient at soldier skills and coach him how to interrelate with a non-military neighboring populace.
The basics of counterinsurgency have continued virtually equal for all the scientific innovations of the gone century. Then like now a work force intensive process is substantially reliant on useful human intelligence assembly and interaction (Bradford, 2011). We also find that the classic guerrilla approach might not be the best in winning but instead will distract other side from victory. At the same time, the United States forces breaks down or else the people of United States demands to pull out the prolong the fight until the resolution of the matter.
The attack pattern, as well as the counterattack, seems to be typical guerrilla fighting where the weaker power attacks in a chosen place and then subside into the populace. Similarly, the more difficult an occupying power fights back the more it alienates the public, developing communities that admit, if not hold up, armed opposition. In conclusion, Iraq forces planners and policy makers would be better served to learn the lessons from the Philippines War.